The thesis put forward by the British philosopher, Roger Scruton (born 1944) in The Uses of Pessimism seems simple: false hope together with an optimism that is unfounded and unscrupulous are the cause of the most harmful conflicts of our times. Political conflicts, institutional and financial crises, unjustified pedagogic notions, non-consensual town planning, etc., are some of the issues that the author analyses with the help of specific historical examples. Before referring to some of these issues, I shall (...) describe the scheme of reasoning Scruton uses to put this book together. The Uses of Pessimism is divided into twelve chapters, seven of which are devoted to analysing different fallacies. In this work the author analyses arguments he considers to be fallacies. This fact is important as the book’s chapters explicitly enumerate all the fallacies Scruton refers to in the book: The First-Person Future; The Best Case Fallacy; The Born Free Fallacy; The Utopian Fallacy; The Zero Sum Fallacy; The Planning Fallacy; The Moving Spirit Fallacy, and The Aggregation Fallacy. (shrink)

Roger Scruton is Britain's best-known intellectual dissident, who has defended English traditions and English identity against an official culture of denigration. Although his writings on philosophical aesthetics have shown him to be a leading authority in the field, his defence of political conservatism has marked him out in academic circles as Public Enemy Number One. Contrary to orthodox opinion, however, Roger Scruton is a human being, and Gentle Regrets contains the proof of it - a quiet, (...) witty but also serious and moving account of the ways in which life brought him to think what he thinks, and to be what he is. His moving vignettes of his childhood and later influences illuminate this book. (shrink)

Emphasizing the continuity between his moral and aesthetic doctrines and the metaphysical basis in which they rest, the author explores Kant's relation to Leibniz and Hume, and his attempt to construct a philosophy which was neither rationalist nor empiricist, and could display the limits of human understanding; he shows that Kant was not only a master of philosophical criticism, but the greater defender of the objectivity of human knowledge, in both the scientific and the moral spheres.

A modern philosopher and author of Modern Philosophy presents a useful, refreshing guide for "doing" rather than "studying" philosophy, making the subject accessible and real to the layperson. 10,000 first printing.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by:Art and Politics in Roger Scruton’s Conservative Philosophy by Ferenc HÖRCHERD. N. ByrneHÖRCHER, Ferenc. Art and Politics in Roger Scruton’s Conservative Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. vii + 404 pp. Cloth, $129.99The intellectual legacy of Sir Roger Scruton defies the conventional wisdom that conservatism is a mood or sensibility rather than a systematic body of ideas. Then, as Hörcher indicates, Scruton (...) was never a particularly conventional thinker. Against the current that equated intellectualism with political critique, Scruton espoused traditionalism, community ahead of individualism, and order against pluralism. Against the current as well, he took his reflections to the court of public opinion rather than to the halls of academe. (shrink)

ROGER SCRUTON’s An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Philosophy takes a personal and provocative look at the subject—those abstract, but nevertheless practical, problems that concern anyone who has reflected on his or her life. Of special delight is his discussion of sex and music. I make some brief critical comments on this based on new economic approaches.

In his most recent work, the contemporary philosopher Roger Scruton has turned his attention to religion. Although a religious sensibility ties together his astonishingly prodigious and dynamic output as a philosopher, poet and composer, his recent exploration of religious and theological themes from a philosophical point of view has excited a fresh response from scholars. This collection of writings addresses Scruton's challenging and subtle philosophy of religion for the first time. The volume includes contributions from those who (...) specialize in the philosophy of religion, the history of thought and culture, aesthetics, and church history. The collection is introduced by Mark Dooley, author of two books on Scruton, and includes a response to the writings from Scruton himself in which he develops his idea of the sacred and the erotic and defends the integrity of his work as an attempt to give a sense of the Lebenswelt (or 'lifeworld'): how humans experience the world. He argues that religion emerges from that experience and transforms us from beings bound by causal necessity into persons who acknowledge freedom, obligation and right. A unique and fascinating collection of writings that sheds light on this hitherto unexplored aspect of Roger Scruton's philosophy. (shrink)

The article addresses the concepts of nation and nationalism in Roger Scruton's political thought. It is divided into two parts: 1) the critical presentation of the classical arguments about nation and nationalism, in authors such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, David Miller, Anthony D. Smith and Yoram Hazony; 2) an analysis of Scruton's arguments about the nation and nationalism. Scruton opposes the arguments of Anderson, Gellner, and Hobsbawm, who understood the nation as an artificial (...) construct. In the article, Scruton's conservative idea is defended, especially, highlighting concepts such as: Nation-State and Nation, local and national loyalties, which correspond to the protection of small platoons, and association and civil society are also fundamental. The foundation of conservatism in Scruton rests on the concept of the nation-state, political sovereignty, and loyalty, as well as on the interpretation of Burkean thought of the departed, the living and the unborn. (shrink)

This book collects some of the most exciting pioneering work in perceptual and cognitive psychology. The authors' quantitative approach to the study of mental images and their representation is clearly depicted in this invaluable volume of research which presents, interprets, evaluates, and extends their work. The selections are preceded by a thorough review of the history of their experiments, and all of the articles have been updated with reviews of the current literature. The book's first part focuses on mental (...) rotation; the second includes other, more complex transformations and sequences of transformations. A third part describes work on rotational transformations in the context of the perceptual illusion of &"apparent motion.&" Roger N. Shepard is Professor of Psychology, Stanford University. Lynn A. Cooper is Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

In Conservatism Past and Present: A Philosophical Introduction, Tristan J. Rogers argues that philosophical conservatism is a coherent and compelling set of historically rooted ideas about conserving and promoting the human good. Part I, "Conservatism Past," presents a history of conservative ideas, exploring themes, such as the search for wisdom, the limits of philosophy, reform in preference to revolution, the relationship between authority and freedom, and liberty as a living tradition. Major figures include Aristotle, Saint Aquinas, Edmund Burke, G.W.F. Hegel, (...) and Roger Scruton. Part II, "Conservatism Present," applies philosophical conservatism to contemporary conservative politics, focusing on issues such as nationalism, populism, the family, education, and responsibility. Rogers shows that conservatism has been defined differently at different times: as a loose set of connected ideas reacting against the French Revolution; as a kind of disposition or instinct in favor of the status quo; and more recently as any ideas opposed to the political left. But he also allows a set of questions to guide his argument for conservatism's merits: What is conservatism? Is it a coherent and attractive philosophy? What are conservatives for? And how is today's conservatism related to its past? In his answers, Rogers paints a compelling and coherent picture of an aligned and attractive set of ideas. (shrink)

This book is a completely rewritten version of the author's earlier Capitalism or Worker Control?. Its central thesis is that, despite the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union, capitalism cannot be justified on either economic or ethical grounds. There is in fact an alternative to capitalism that promises greater efficiency, and equality, and more rational growth, democracy and meaningful work. This alternative, Economic Democracy, is market socialism with decentralised investment planning and workplace democracy. (...) Professor Schweickart compares this model with other models – laissez-faire conservatism, the Keynesian welfare state, and 'neo-liberalism' – and argues that it is really superior on every count. He also sketches out a possible transition from advanced capitalism, from what is left of the centrally planned economies, and from Third World underdevelopment, to Economic Democracy. The author concludes with some reflections on Marx's communism, as historical materialism, and on the future of Marxism. (shrink)

We are pleased that all the commentators seem to agree that a theory-driven integration across disciplines is a worthwhile endeavor to better understand the social constitution of emotion. In our reply, we first take up the idea of relating affect control theory (ACT) to cultural priming and suggest links to an ACT-inspired constraint satisfaction explanation of priming. Second, we address reservations concerning ACT’s capability to account for emotions with nonconceptual content and to explain stability and change in affective meanings. Third, (...) we clarify the relation of affect control theory to psychological constructionism, in particular with regard to conceptualizations of culture and society. Finally, we suggest that computational models are an adequate tool to address multilevel issues in the study of emotion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge's Oriental PilgrimageRoger CorlessThe Victorian Translation of China: James Legge's Oriental Pilgrimage. By Norman J.Girardot. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2002. xxx + 780 pp.Don't make the mistake I made and allow the size of this book intimidate you. I let it sit around for many months, fearing, as did the author, to "[row] out over the great ocean (...) of material" (pp. xix-xx), but once I had set sail I found myself in enjoyable, if sometimes irascible, company and I was unwilling to jump ship. Girardot is in full command of his ark of fascinating and diverse creatures, and his main argument is never lost in the details. His writing is lucid and the text is broken up into manageable blocks by subheadings with intriguing titles, rendering each segment ehipassiko, encouraging us to keep reading.A book of this importance and weight (about 1.5 kg) deserves a review article more than just a review, or, better, a discussion panel at a major academic conference. This journal is notorious for reviews of astonishing length, but I would like my review to be short enough that it will actually be read, so that it will entice you to read the book. I will not attempt a summary nor will I critically address all the issues that are brought up. Instead, I will try to show why I regard this book as an instant classic and even, I would say, a watershed in the meta-science of sinological and Religionswissenschaftlich self-reflection.We all know James Legge as the perpetrator of The Chinese Classics, the multivolume opus that, in the 1960 Hong Kong University Press revision, dominates the Chinese religion(s) section of our personal libraries. Since there is nothing like it, we consult it, but we pretend we do not, for, after all, it's out of date, surely, and Legge was an old fuddy-duddy—Scottish, a Protestant missionary, and, worst of all, a Victorian. Girardot seems to have had somewhat this opinion of Legge when he assayed a brief biography of him, but he discovered that his "Legge work" (as he calls it) opened the door to a pivotal era in academe and world culture. Once the door to the long-neglected cupboard had been opened, all kinds of fascinating objects came tumbling out. "Oh, so that's how it used to be, and that's why it's like this today!" No scholar of Chinese religion(s) can afford to ignore Girardot's extensive and insightful ruminations on the state of the field then and now.The point of the book is summed up on page 531: "[Legge] is an outstanding [End Page 276] example of the difficult nineteenth-century passage from religious discourse to what Edward Said calls the 'secular criticism' of the modern world." To study Legge is to study the origins of our discipline. He may have been a fuddy-duddy; he was certainly a workaholic, putting his Sassenach colleagues at Oxford to shame by sleeping little and rising in the middle of the night to persist in his hermeneutic labors. But he was also a student of the heathen land he went to convert, and he tried his best not only to see (the presumed universal) God in the ancient texts but also to find something noble in apparent atheists and agnostics such as Confucius. In his interaction with Max Mueller (and this book is as much about Mueller as it is about Legge) he both agreed and disagreed, in a complex choreography, with the comparative method underpinning The Sacred Books of the East. He was a Scotsman's Scotsman, a stag at bay, dourly standing his ground (as a Congregationalist, and therefore a nonconformist both north and south of the border) against, first, the London Missionary Society and, later, the prevailing academic and ecclesiastical climate at Oxford.No armchair orientalist, as were some of his colleagues across the Channel, he befriended native informants and studied the indigenous commentaries (mostly Qing) to which they referred him, so that his translations, although not as fluid as Waley... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, CultureRoger CorlessOn Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture. By Robert Magliola. Preface by Edith Wyschogrod. American Academy of Religion Cultural Criticism Series, edited by Cleo McNelly Kearns, Number 3. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997. xxii + 202 pp.How does one review a deconstructionist book—a book that seeks not only to discuss deconstruction but to be deconstructionist, a book that simultaneously takes books seriously and (...) mocks both the author and the reader for imagining there could ever be such a thing as a book, a something that is written and then read, a writing that says that everything is Writing but that all Writing/writing is written under erasure and so is (as p. 202 explicitly, self-reflexively proclaims itself) an empty page that is, by that very emptiness, marked? Derrida derides the Introduction, for, he asks (without speaking, parlant avec dénégations, denying that he is expressing denials) what is being Introduced? What do we think we are doing when we lead a reader into (introducere) something that is not there to be lead into until a reader is lead or leads himself or herself into it? Do we not, thus, need an Introduction to the Introduction, and another Introduction to that Introduction, a regressus ad infinitum introductionum? Edith Wyschogrod writes a Preface. Does she mean us to think that the book has a Face, and that it therefore needs a pre-Face? Does she think that she/we face toward the book, or does the book face toward her/us, or does/do she/we both together face toward the putative subject matter, which itself has two faces, Buddhism and Christianity? And who am I, the reviewer?This cannot be a review (a looking-over), but it might be a re-view (a looking-again), which informs (in-forms, incarnates) itself so that you, dear Introducer of Yourself, can review (look over) your presuppositions about Buddhism, Christianity, life-worlds, and reality in general, and re-view them (re-visit them, look again at them) so as to reform (re-view, see-again, as formless, and thus re-form) them.One draws a circle, says Charles Fort, beginning anywhere. So let us open the book at random. On page 84 we find: “Taiwan has over 25,000 students studying in the United States, the largest foreign contingent in American universities.” This aggressively logocentric sentence is provided with a footnote: “Statistic of 1987. Since then, the proportion of Chinese from the People’ [sic] Republic has become much more noticeable.” Hmm—a little typo, but nevertheless we are, to our surprise, deep in the overheated hotel conference rooms of the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion. So, why are we told this? It is part of a section that cuts (“Lt. sect-, cut”, we are reminded on p. 175) across (cross-hatches) Magliola’s life/lives run/runs (Curriculum Vitae, Curricula Vitae, Curricula Vitae Novae, Curricula Vitarum, as the chapter headings have it) as an academic, a Catholic, an almost-priest, a Buddhist meditator, a husband, a divorcé, an Italian, an American, [End Page 216] a resident of Taiwan. All these spill out from the overstuffed closet of Magliola’s life/lives, which, without warning, he opens upon us and then sits among the salade challenging the reader to become bricoleur. But if we do, we feel we have missed the point. Or we have seen the point—which is just as bad.Crosshatch: that’s the theme, I think. Cross, “X” (both the Roman character “eks” and the Greek character “chi”), crucifix, saltire, cross-religions, cross-cultures, cross-countries, cross-country, crossing-out (rature), and finally, revelation by relationis oppositio under/through four forks (“Il ne s’écrit que sous la grille des quatre fourches”—p. 177, quoting Derrida).Magliola is on this cross, he is cross (angry/mad), he is crucified by it, he hopes to cross over by means of it. “This book is not written for the arrived by the arrived” (p. xix), yet he is “on the water, not at sea” (p. xx).It may not be incorrect to say that the book is in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis by Thomas A. RegelskiRoger MantieThomas A. Regelski, A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis (New York: Routledge, 2016)ANSWERS WITHOUT QUESTIONSThomas Regelski has earned a place as a major figure in music education, if for no other reason than his role as co-convener of the MayDay Group in (...) 1993. Regelski’s contributions to the profession, however, go much beyond the MayDay Group. His many books and articles provide both practical advice and suggestions for music teachers as well as rigorous discussions of important issues for scholars. He is among the most frequently cited authors in music education today and I count myself among those who have been deeply impacted by his work.1Those familiar with Regelski’s oeuvre and the history of the MayDay Group know that “praxial philosophy” has been his central concern since the early 1990s. The idea of praxialism, a term more or less invented by a small group of music education academics,2 has been driven, at least in part, by a desire to counter what has been considered (by some) to be the music education profession’s misguided adherence to and emphasis on “music education as aesthetic education,” particularly as an outgrowth of its Charles Leonard-Bennett Reimer [End Page 213] lineage.3 Along with contemporaries Philip Alperson, Wayne Bowman, and David Elliott (among others), Regelski has been a major voice in adopting and adapting ancient Greek (especially Aristotelean) thought in order to challenge the presupposition, predominant in twentieth-century academic discourse, that a (or the) philosophy of music education should unquestioningly derive from philosophies of art or aesthetics. Through the deployment of concepts such as theoria, techne, poiesis, phronesis, and especially, praxis, Regelski has, along with a cadre of like-minded thinkers, attempted, in the tradition of Christopher Small, to encourage educators to place greater emphasis on the social aspects of music making rather than on the so-called “aesthetic properties” of the music itself. For almost three decades, Regelski has been consistent, if not relentless in his promotion of all things “praxial.”A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis (hereafter A Brief Introduction) comprises seven short chapters. The first three (Part One: Ideology Critique) provide an historical, if editorialized, overview of the history of aesthetics, from its ancient Greek origins in aisthesis to what Regelski calls today’s “aesthetic rationale” for music education. The last four chapters (Part Two: Theory into Praxis and Praxis Informed by Theory) provide arguments for why a praxial philosophy provides a superior basis for music education, along with illustrations of what music teaching based on praxialism might look like in practice. Readers already acquainted with Regelski’s previous writings are unlikely to find anything new in A Brief Introduction. Many of the book’s themes, such as “automania,” “sacrilization of music,” “legitimation crisis,” “pragmatic difference,” “action learning,” and “breaking 100” will be familiar to those who have read his essays over the years. A Brief Introduction, however, is not intended for those already familiar with his previous writings, but for newcomers, such as upper level undergraduates, for whom A Brief Introduction provides, as the title appropriately suggests, a succinct summary of his ideas distilled into just over a hundred pages. Rather than a stand-alone textbook, Regelski imagines the book as a “complement” to other courses, such as introductory classes in music education, conducting classes, instrumental method courses, and so on. Although not stated explicitly, much of the book’s content is relevant primarily (though perhaps not exclusively) for an American/Canadian readership.Regelski explains from the outset that the ideas in the book “are intended as a corrective to current practices and traditions in music teaching” (xx), ones he considers based upon and reflective of “aesthetic ideology.” As he explains, he wishes to operate in the tradition of Critical Theory, where ideology means the imposition of a dominant group’s values over a subordinate group. Although he never discusses processes of social reproduction, established norms and practices [End Page 214] in institutional... (shrink)

The author reprises his review of The DIM Hypothesis by arguing for an expansion and revision of Leonard Peikoff's model to include not three, but four primary positions regarding integration : Integration, Disintegration, Abstract Misintegration, and Concrete Misintegration—and to include not just two mixtures of those primary positions, but twelve. He offers it as a work in progress and a remedy to the over-restrictiveness and resulting misrepresentations of various philosophers by Peikoff's version of the model.

Of all the things we eat or drink, wine is without question the most complex. So it should not be surprising that philosophers have turned their attention to wine: complex phenomena can lend themselves to philosophical speculation. Wine is complex not just in the variety of tastes it presents – ‘wine tastes of everything apart from grapes’, I once heard an expert say – but in its meaning...

This review essay provides a critical assessment of Christopher Winch and John Gingell's Philosophy & Educational Policy: A Critical Introduction. This book presents a powerful and stimulating challenge to conventional and sloppy thinking about a wide range of issues confronting anyone who is seriously concerned with schooling in the 21st century. While each chapter merits an essay in response, this article can merely highlight the virtues of the book as well as the respects in which a number of claims (...) remain unpersuasive. There is found to be a noticeable difference between the odd and even numbered chapters, betraying perhaps the difference in authorship and suggesting insufficient discussion between the authors as to their overall content. Chapters 3, 5 and 9 are, for the most part, outstandingly good and should inject a note of caution into policy makers' all too frequent desire for change. The extent to which the authors favour democratic decision‐making on educational matters is shown, however, to be far from clear. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 373 in the analysis of the "artificial" virtue of justice. Though he uses the term "faculties" as synonymous with energies or powers, he warns against the "faculty psychology" that uses faculties as explanations or causes. Hume writes: "By will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel.., when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." A (...) voluntary action, being "knowingly" aroused, is not a mere "direct " passion arising immediately from sensation; nevertheless, it belongs to the realm of passions rather than of judgments. It is included in the "bundle of impressions" psychology. Hume attempts to explain how the passion of sympathy serves to communicate impressions. Emotional expressions require the operation of the "imagination" to generate the social controls of conscience and to explain the origin of responsibility in terms of approvals and disapprovals. In this connection, /~rdal points out the differences between Hume's and Adam Smith's psychology of sympathy, ttume is content to rely largely on "imagination" to explain social sensitivities, whereas Adam Smith develops the theory that by sympathy men are led to put themselves in the place of others and thus to get a "disinterested spectator" view of passions. This seems to me a minor difference, and Hume, though he knew of Adam Smith's theory, and though he criticized him on other points, does not directly obiect to this particular doctrine of Adam Smith. It is, in fact, related to Hume's own analysis of justice as an "artificial" virtue, not directly related to the self-regarding passions. What separates Smith from Hume is his discussion of sympathy in the context of pity and benevolence which the Scottish moralists had made basic, whereas ttume keeps sympathy as a passion distinct from the virtues. In general, I have the "impression" that Hume, after he made this elaborate effort to apply experimental method to the passions and to valuational expressions, left the further development of this psychology to his close friend, Adam Smith, while he turned to "political essays" and to the more practical problems of the Enquiry. In his political essays, which brought him into public recognition in England and on the Continent while the Treatise continued to be basic for the Scottish social psychologists, Hume became especially concerned to call attention to the social operation of "opinions" and faiths. Therefore, it seems to me to be a mistake to regard the Enquiry as merely a "popular" edition of the Treatise. Hume shifted his interest from the critique of Locke's psychology to the practical problems of politics and morals. His History deals less with the psychological "origins" of customs, beliefs, and habits, more with their power in shaping the course of events. In other words, for Hume's ideas about judgments of value and the motivation of policies and principles, one must turn to Hume's later writings. The reader of ~rdal's excellent analysis of the Treatise cannot refrain from hoping that the author will make a similar examination of Hume's later "moral science." For, in addition to clarifying Hume, it will give.Ardal an opportunity to continue his own critical insights on present-day discussion of emotivist and intuitional ethics, which are not the least valuable feature of this volume. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By Jean Gu~henno. Translated from the French by John and Doreen Weightman. (2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 460. Vol. II, pp. xi + 316. set $17.50.) Rousseau and Jean-Jacques It has been Rousseau's peculiar fate to exercise a double fascination. A major philosopher, especially in the fields of education, politics, and morality, Jean-Jacques has also been read, loved, and hated as a man. In reading again Jean Gu~henno's impressive biography, recently published in an excellent English translation, one wonders why so much attention has been paid to Rousseau's private life. Surely it is not because he lacks the credentials of a serious thinker; the Second Discourse alone, not to mention the Emile and Social Contract, would presumably ensure Rousseau's place in any historical survey of Western... (shrink)

I examine Roger Scruton's account of the religious and soteriological significance of Wagner's Tristan and Isolde . The relation between Scruton and Wagner remains unclear, and the position at issue is a curious amalgam of the two. I refer to its author as ‘Scruton's Wagner’. Scruton's Wagner argues that erotic love has religious and soteriological significance, and that the notions of religion and salvation are to be defined in terms which are shorn of any reference (...) to God. I argue that there may be good reasons for setting these limits short of God, but that Scruton's Wagner does not provide them. (shrink)